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Preventive and Reactive Cyber Defense Dynamics
Is Globally Stable
Ren Zheng, Wenlian Lu, and Shouhuai Xu
Abstract—The recently proposed cybersecurity dynamics ap-
proach aims to understand cybersecurity from a holistic per-
spective by modeling the evolution of the global cybersecurity
state. These models describe the interactions between the various
kinds of cyber defenses and the various kinds of cyber attacks.
We study a particular kind of cybersecurity dynamics caused by
the interactions between preventive and reactive defenses (e.g.,
filtering and malware detection) against push- and pull-based
cyber attacks (e.g., malware spreading and “drive-by download”
attacks). The dynamics was previously shown to be globally stable
in a special regime of the parameter universe, but little is known
beyond this special regime. In this paper, we resolve an open
problem in this domain by proving that the dynamics is globally
stable in the entire parameter universe (i.e., the dynamics always
converges to a unique equilibrium). We discuss the cybersecurity
meanings and implications of this theoretic result. We also prove
that the dynamics converges exponentially to the equilibrium
except for a special parameter regime, in which case the dynamics
converges polynomially. Since it is often difficult to compute
the equilibrium, we propose new bounds of the equilibrium
and numerically show that these bounds are tighter than those
proposed in the literature.
Index Terms—Cybersecurity dynamics, preventive and reactive
cyber defense dynamics, cyber attack-defense dynamics, cyber-
security models, cybersecurity foundation
I. INTRODUCTION
Any approach that aims to understand cybersecurity from
a holistic perspective needs to model the interactions between
the various kinds of cyber attacks and the various kinds of
cyber defenses. Recently, a new approach called cybersecu-
rity dynamics [30] has shown its potential for systematically
understanding, characterizing, and quantifying cybersecurity
from a holistic perspective [39], [33], [28], [31], [8], [5], [35],
[18], [36], [29], [34], [15]. At a high level, this approach aims
to characterize how the attack-defense interactions govern the
evolution of the global cybersecurity state [30], [31], and
how the resulting characteristics can be applied to guide
cyber defense operations (see, for example, [18], [35]). The
approach was inspired by multiple earlier endeavors in several
disciplines [30], including: (i) Biological Epidemic Models
[19], [14], [2], [1], [9] as well as their adaptations to the
cyberspace setting, namely Cyber Epidemic Models, which
were pioneered by Kephart and White [12], [13] and later
elegantly developed to accommodate specific kinds of network
structures (e.g., power-law [22], [20], [22], [23], [21], [3])
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and arbitrary network structures (e.g., [27], [7], [4], [26]); (ii)
Interacting Particle Systems [17], which study the collective
behaviors and phenomena that can be exhibited by interacting
components; (iii) Microfoundation in Economics [11], which
aims to connect macroeconomic theories to the underlying
microeconomic behaviors of agents. The cybersecurity dynam-
ics approach has two telling features that distinguish it from
these inspiring endeavors. One feature is that the approach
can offer a systematic treatment of complex cyber attack-
defense interactions, including preventive and reactive defense
dynamics [34], [5], [36], [29], [15], adaptive defense dynamics
[35], active defense dynamics [39], [33], [18], and proactive
defense dynamics [8]. Another feature is that the approach
articulates a systematic set of technical barriers that need to
be adequately addressed [30].
In this paper, we investigate preventive and reactive defense
dynamics, namely the evolution of the global cybersecurity
state caused by the interaction between cyber attacks and
preventive and reactive cyber defenses, which represent two
classes of cyber defense mechanisms that have been widely
employed. Preventive defense mechanisms, including various
intrusion prevention tools such as filtering, aim to prevent
cyber attacks from succeeding. Reactive defense mechanisms,
such as anti-malware tools, aim to detect and clean the com-
promised computers. The cyber attacks we consider include
the following two classes. One class is the push-based attacks,
such as malwares that actively seek and attack vulnerable
computers in cyberspace. The other class is the pull-based
attacks, such as drive-by downloads [24] by which vulnerable
browsers/computers get compromised when visiting malicious
websites. The full-fledged preventive and reactive defense
dynamics model accommodating these attack-defense inter-
actions was introduced in [16] and analytically treated in
[34]. The full-fledged model supersedes the model that was
investigated in [27], [7], [4], [26], which considered push-
based attacks only.
An important research problem for understanding (preven-
tive and reactive) cyber defense dynamics is: What phe-
nomenon does the dynamics exhibit? The state-of-the-art
understanding is that the dynamics is globally stable in a
special regime of the parameter universe, but little is known
beyond this special regime [27], [7], [4], [26], [34]. Figure 1(a)
illustrates the special parameter regime as the white-colored
open area, where “open” means that properties of the dynamics
on the dashed boundary were not known. The illustration
equally applies to the model of preventive and reactive cyber
defenses against push-based attacks [27], [7], [4], [26], and the
full-fledged model of preventive and reactive cyber defenses
2against push-based and pull-based attacks [16], [34].
Known: Within this particular 
parameter regime, the 
dynamics is globally stable.
Unknown: What occurs to the 
dynamics in this parameter regime 
(e.g., does it converge at all)?
(a) Prior results: partial knowledge
This paper: The dynamics is globally 
stable in the entire parameter 
universe (i.e., the dynamics always
converges to a unique equilibrium). 
Moreover, the convergence is either 
exponential or polynomial (the latter 
only applies, under a certain 
circumstance, to the dashed 
boundary shown on the left figure)
(b) New result: full knowledge
Fig. 1. Illustration of results. (a) Prior results: The dynamics is globally
stable in the parameter regime that is illustrated as the white-colored open
area of parameter regime. It was not known whether or not the dynamics
converges in the other regime of the parameter universe, including the dashed
boundary. (b) Our new result: The dynamics is globally stable in the entire
parameter universe, and the convergence speed is completely characterized.
Our contributions. In this paper, we make three contribu-
tions. First, we tackle the open problem illustrated in Figure
1(a), by proving that preventive and reactive cyber defense
dynamics is globally stable in the entire parameter universe
as illustrated in Figure 1(b). This means that the dynamics
always converges to a unique equilibrium regardless of the
initial global cybersecurity state, as illustrated in Figure 2(a).
In order to demonstrate the cybersecurity meaning of this theo-
retical result, let us consider the following security metric: the
fraction i of compromised computers in an enterprise network,
namely the number of compromised computers divided by
the total number of computers in the network. This metric
reflects the global cybersecurity state, and can be used to
set (for example) the threshold of successful attacks that can
be tolerated (e.g., using threshold cryptosystems to tolerate
the fraction of compromised computers [6], [32]). Note that
this metric is not static but dependent upon time, namely
that 0 ≤ i(t) ≤ 1 for any t ∈ [0,+∞). Knowing that the
dynamics is globally stable allows the defender to measure
i(t) when the dynamics is in equilibrium, possibly through
the use of some sampling methods such as the one presented
in [34]. This measurement-based method for estimating the
equilibrium is valuable because it does not require the defender
to know the values of the model parameters. In contrast, Figure
2(b) illustrates an “unmanageable” situation, where i(t) does
not exhibit any pattern and can even be chaotic, meaning
that i(t) is unpredictable because it is too sensitive to the
initial value i(0). Consequently, i(t) cannot be measured in
real time regardless of the sampling methods that may be
used, because the state might have already changed after the
sampling operation.
Second, it was known that the dynamics converges exponen-
tially to a unique equilibrium in the white-colored open area of
parameter regime illustrated in Figure 1(a) [27], [7], [4], [26],
[34]. Little is known beyond this special parameter regime. We
prove that the dynamics of preventive and reactive defenses
against push-based attacks (i.e., α = 0 in the terminology of
the model) converges polynomially in the parameter regime
corresponding to the dashed boundary illustrated in Figure
1(a). We also prove that the dynamics converges exponentially
in the parameter regime corresponding to the blue-colored
Time0
1
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(a) Global stability allows measurement
Fig. 2. Global stability implies that sampling-based security measurement
is possible. (a) Global stability means that the dynamics always converges to
a unique equilibrium that is independent of the initial cybersecurity state or
the fraction i(0) ∈ [0, 1] of compromised computers at time t = 0. In this
case, the equilibrium i∗ = i(t→∞) can be measured using some sampling-
based methods without knowing the values of the model parameters. (b) The
“unmanageable” situation where i(t) ∈ [0, 1] cannot be feasibly measured
because the global cybersecurity state might have already changed after the
measurement operation.
area illustrated in Figure 1(a). That is, we now have a full
characterization of the convergence speed of the dynamics.
Third, we give new bounds on the equilibrium i∗ = i(t →
∞). The bounds are useful because it is often difficult to
compute the equilibrium. For example, when the defender
cannot use the sampling-based approach to estimate the equi-
librium, the defender can instead use the upper bound of i∗
for decision-making, while noting that the price is the possible
overprovision of defense resources. We numerically show that
our new upper and lower bounds are respectively tighter than
their counterparts in [34].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we describe the continuous-time preventive and reactive cyber
defense dynamics model, which is in parallel to the discrete-
time dynamics model investigated in [16], [34]. In Section III,
we review some results that will be used later in the present
paper. In Section IV, we present our new results. In Section
V, we use simulation to validate the new results (due to the
lack of real data). In Section VI, we discuss the related prior
work. In Section VII, we conclude the paper with some open
problems for future research. Due to space limitation, we defer
proofs of most theorems to the Appendix.
II. MODELING PREVENTIVE AND REACTIVE CYBER
DEFENSE DYNAMICS
As in the discrete-time model [34], we consider the in-
teractions between push-based attacks and pull-based attacks
against preventive defenses (e.g., intrusion prevention) and
reactive defenses (e.g., anti-malware tools). Push-based attacks
naturally formulate a cyber attack structure that can be mod-
eled as a network G = (V,E), where V = {1, 2, . . . , n} is
the set of computers in the network, (u, v) ∈ E means that
a compromised computer or node u can launch push-based
attacks directly against a secure but vulnerable computer or
node v, and G can be directed or undirected. (It is worth
mentioning that the abstraction can be equally applied to finer
granularities; e.g., u represents a software component in a
computer.)
Note that G is not necessarily the underlying physical or
communication network structure, except perhaps in scenarios
such as sensor networks or email networks. In principle, G
can be extracted from network security configurations. For
3example, some computers or IP addresses are prohibited from
communicating with some other computers or IP addresses.
This kind of access restriction is widely employed in the
physical world for protecting sensitive facilities (e.g., only
authorized users can have access to a military base), and is
important for alleviating a cyber attack-defense asymmetry
described in [39], [33]. The extraction of G requires having
access to the data describing enterprise networks and their
security configurations, and is therefore an orthogonal research
problem that needs to be investigated separately. Given that
the kind of data is hard to obtain for academic researchers,
characterization studies—including the present paper—should
not make any restrictions on the structure of G. In other words,
we should accommodate arbitrary network structures for G.
The adjacency matrix of cyber attack structure G is denoted
by A = [avu]n×n where avu = 1 if and only if (u, v) ∈
E. Because we focus on attacks launched by compromised
computers against others, we naturally let avv = 0, which
means that privilege escalation is not explicitly accommo-
dated. Instead, a computer is always treated as compromised
after it is penetrated and before it is cleaned up. Denote
by deg(v) the (in-)degree of node v in G, because G can
be directed or undirected. Note that deg(v) = |Nv| where
Nv = {u ∈ V : (u, v) ∈ E}.
In parallel to the discrete-time model investigated in [34],
we consider a continuous-time model. At any point in time t, a
node v ∈ V is in one of two states: secure (i.e., secure but vul-
nerable, denoted by “0”) or compromised (denoted by “1”). Let
sv(t) and iv(t) respectively denote the probability that node v
is secure and compromised at time t, where sv(t) + iv(t) = 1
for any v ∈ V and any t ≥ 0. The global cybersecurity state
probability vector is s(t) = [s1(t), · · · , sn(t)], or equivalently
i(t) = [i1(t), · · · , in(t)].
0 
(secure)
1 
(compromised)
Tv, 0o1(t)
Tv, 1o0(t)
Fig. 3. State-transition diagram of an individual node v ∈ V in the nonlinear
Dynamical System model, where θv,0→1 is nonlinear.
Figure 3 illustrates the state-transition diagram of the
continuous-time nonlinear Dynamical System model. Param-
eter θv,1→0(t) describes the reactive defense power (i.e.,
effectiveness or capability), and is represented by β ∈ (0, 1],
namely the probability that a compromised node becomes
secure at any point in time t because of the reactive defense.
The probability that a secure node gets compromised, namely
θv,0→1(t), is dependent upon the power of pull- and push-
based cyber attacks against the preventive defense in question.
For modeling the power of pull-based cyber attacks against the
preventive defense, we use parameter α ∈ [0, 1] to denote the
probability that a secure node becomes compromised at any
time t despite the deployed preventive defense. For modeling
the power of push-based cyber attacks against the preventive
defense, we use parameter γ ∈ (0, 1] to denote the probability
that a compromised node u successfully attacks a secure node
v, where (u, v) ∈ E. Assuming the compromised nodes launch
attacks against their neighbors independent of each other, we
have
θv,0→1 = 1− (1 − α)
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)
.
This leads to the following continuous-time Dynamical System
model for all v ∈ V :{
d
dt
sv(t) = θv,1→0(t) · iv(t)− θv,0→1(t) · sv(t)
d
dt
iv(t) = θv,0→1(t) · sv(t)− θv,1→0(t) · iv(t),
which can be rewritten as
div(t)
dt
= −βiv(t) +
[
1− (1− α)
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)](
1− iv(t)
)
.
(1)
The main research task is to analyze the system of n nonlinear
equations given by (1).
Discussion on the assumptions and extensions. First, we
assume away the extraction of the cyber attack structure G of
real-world networks and the obtaining of the model parameters
(i.e., α, β and γ). This is reasonable because these research
problems are orthogonal to the focus of the present charac-
terization study. Nevertheless, we note that characterization
studies can suggest practical methods for alleviating the re-
liance on model parameters. For example, the characterization
reported in [34] showed that it is possible to use sampling-
based methods to estimate the equilibrium without knowing
the values of α, β and γ. We anticipate that more results will
be developed along this direction in the future.
Second, we assume G, α, β, and γ are time-independent.
These assumptions would be valid for a short period of time,
namely when the dynamics converges exponentially. It is an
important future work to investigate the dynamics while ac-
commodating time-dependent parameters, namely G(t), α(t),
β(t) and γ(t). On the other hand, we will show that our
results can be easily extended to the setting where α, β,
and γ are heterogeneous as follows: αv accommodates that
different nodes may have different capabilities in preventing
pull-based attacks from succeeding, βv accommodates that
different nodes may have different capabilities in detecting and
cleaning up compromised computers, γuv accommodates that
different nodes may have different capabilities in preventing
the push-based attacks launched from different neighbors from
succeeding. In other words, the global stability result remains
valid for heterogeneous αv , βv and γuv .
Third, we assume that the compromised nodes launch at-
tacks independent of each other. This assumption is widely
made in the literature. The first work that aimed at getting
rid of this independence assumption (i.e., accommodating the
dependence instead) is [28], which opens the door to many
open problems for future study.
Despite the assumptions mentioned above, the present study
is already fairly involved. Therefore, the present study should
be seen as a significant step going beyond [34] in the direction
towards systematically understanding preventive and reactive
cyber defense dynamics. We believe that the present paper
4will inspire many future studies on, for example, weakening
or eliminating the assumptions.
Summary of notations. Let R be the set of real numbers, R+
be the set of nonnegative real numbers, and C be the set of
complex numbers. For comparing two n-dimensional vectors
i = [i1, . . . , in] ∈ R
n and j = [j1, . . . , jn] ∈ Rn, we use the
following notations:
• “i ≥ j” means iv ≥ jv for all v ∈ [1, . . . , n],
• “i > j” means i ≥ j and iv > jv for some v ∈ [1, . . . , n],
and
• “i≫ j” means that iv > jv for all v ∈ [1, . . . , n].
Table I summarizes the other major notations used in the paper.
TABLE I
NOTATIONS USED THROUGHOUT THE PAPER.
G = (V, E), A the cyber attack structure G and its adjacency ma-
trix representation A = [avu]n×n where avu = 1
if and only if (u, v) ∈ E
α ∈ [0, 1] the probability a secure but vulnerable node be-
comes compromised because of pull-based attacks
despite the preventive defense
β ∈ (0, 1] the probability a compromised node becomes se-
cure because of the reactive defense
γ ∈ (0, 1] the probability a secure but vulnerable node be-
comes compromised because of push-based attacks
despite the preventive defense
Nv v’s neighbors; Nv = {u ∈ V : (u, v) ∈ E}
deg(v) the (in-)degree of node v; deg(v) = |Nv|
λM,1 the largest eigenvalue of matrix M
iv(t) the probability v is compromised at time t
O the original point O = [0, · · · , 0]n ∈ Rn
1 the point 1 = [1, · · · , 1]n ∈ Rn
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Algebraic Graph Theory
A directed graph, such as a directed cyber attack structure
G = (V,E), is said to be strongly connected if there is a
directed path from any node to any other node. A strongly
connected component is a strongly connected subgraph that
is not contained in any other strongly connected subgraph.
The adjacent matrix A of graph G can be rearranged to the
Frobenius form
A =


A11 A12 · · · A1p
0 A22 · · · A2p
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 · · · App

 (2)
where the strongly connected component Ajj is irreducible
for j = 1, . . . , p−1, and App is irreducible or is a zero matrix
with dimension 1. For j = 1, . . . , p, we can define the subset
Vj ⊆ V corresponding to the strongly connected component
Ajj as
Vj = {v ∈ V : v is the node corresponding to a row of Ajj}.
A strongly connected component Ajj is said to be without
in-edges if Ajk = 0 for all k > j.
B. Cooperative Dynamical Systems
Our analysis will utilize some nice properties of cooperative
dynamical systems and subhomogeneous maps.
Definition 1: (cooperative dynamical system [10])
Let x = [x1, . . . , xn]. Let f(·) = [f1(·), · · · , fn(·)] be a
function vector in domain D ⊂ Rn. An autonomous dynamical
system
dx
dt
= f(x)
is said to be cooperative if ∂fv(x)/∂xu ≥ 0 holds for all
u, v ∈ {1, . . . , n} and u 6= v.
Definition 2: (subhomogeneity [38]) Let f(·) : D → D be
a continuous map in domain D ⊂ Rn.
• f(·) is said to be subhomogeneous if f(δx) ≥ δf(x) for
any x ∈ D and δ ∈ (0, 1);
• f(·) is said to be strictly subhomogeneous if f(δx) >
δf(x) for any x ∈ D with x≫ O and δ ∈ (0, 1);
• f(·) is said to be strongly subhomogeneous if f(δx) ≫
δf(x) for any x ∈ D with x≫ O and δ ∈ (0, 1).
Theorem 1: (part of Theorem 1.7 in [10]) If f(·) is cooper-
ative in D ⊂ Rn, then f(·) is monotone in D ⊂ Rn, meaning
that f(j) ≥ f(i) if j > i.
Theorem 2: (Theorem 2.3.2 in [38]) Let g(·) : D → D be
a continuously differentiable map and D ⊂ Rn+ be closed and
contain O. Suppose
(a) g(·) is monotone in D , and
(b) g(·) is strongly subhomogeneous in D .
If g(·) admits a nonempty compact invariant set K ⊂ D , then
g(·) has a fixed point x∗ ≫ O such that every nonempty
compact invariant set of g(·) in D consists of x∗.
Theorem 3: (Theorem 2.2.6 in [38]) Let f(·) : D → D be
a continuously monotone map on D . Assume that a nonempty
compact invariant set K ⊂ D contains only one equilibrium
x∗. Then every trajectory attracted to K converges to x∗.
Theorem 4: (Corollary 3.2 in [37]) Let f(·) : D → D be
a continuously differentiable map and D ⊂ Rn+ be closed and
contain O. Suppose
(a) f(·) is cooperative in D and Df(x) =
[∂fv(x)/∂xu]u,v∈V is block-wise irreducible for
every x ∈ D ,
(b) f(·) is strictly subhomogeneous in D , and
(c) f(O) = 0 and every positive trajectory of f(·) in D is
bounded.
Let s(Df(O)) = max
{
ℜ(λ) : det(λI −Df(O)) = 0
}
.
• If s(Df(O)) ≤ 0, then x∗ = O is globally asymptoti-
cally stable.
• If s(Df(O)) > 0, there exists a unique equilibrium x∗ ∈
D \ {O} that is globally asymptotically stable.
C. Previous Results
In the special case α = 0 (i.e., preventive and reactive
defenses against push-based attacks only), it is known that the
dynamics converges to equilibrium O in the special regime of
the parameter universe given by the following Theorem 5.
5Theorem 5: ([4]) Let parameters G, β and γ be specified
as in the model described above. If
λA,1 < β/γ, (3)
the preventive and reactive cyber defense dynamics, namely
the discrete-time version of system (1) with α = 0, is globally
exponentially stable, namely that the dynamics converges to
the equilibrium O at an exponential speed regardless of the
initial value i(0) = [i1(0), . . . , in(0)].
In the more general case α ≥ 0 (i.e., preventive and
reactive defenses against push-based and pull-based attacks),
the following Theorem 6 supersedes the preceding Theorem
5, because condition (4) degenerates to condition (3) [34].
Theorem 6: ([34]) Let parameters G, α, β and γ be spec-
ified as above. Let H = diag[hv]nv=1 be a diagonal matrix
with
hv =
∣∣∣∣∣−β + (1− α)
∏
u∈Nv
(1− γi∗u)
∣∣∣∣∣ .
If
λ(H+γ(1−α)A),1 < 1, (4)
the preventive and reactive cyber defense dynamics, namely
the discrete-time version of system (1), is globally exponen-
tially stable, namely that the dynamics converges to some equi-
librium i∗ = [i∗1, . . . , i∗n] at an exponential speed regardless of
the initial value i(0) = [i1(0), . . . , in(0)].
IV. NEW RESULTS
As mentioned above, the dynamics is well understood in
the parameter regime specified by the preceding conditions
(3) and (4). Our goal is to characterize the dynamics when
these conditions do not hold, namely when λA,1 ≥ β/γ in
the case α = 0 and when λ(H+γ(1−α)A),1 ≥ 1 in the more
general case α ≥ 0. Note that the latter degenerates to the
former when α = 0.
A. Preparation
We first prove some basic results that are applicable to both
the case α > 0 and the case α = 0. Denote by fv(i) the
right-hand side of system (1), namely
fv(i) = −βiv(t) +
[
1− (1− α)
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)](
1− iv(t)
)
(5)
where v ∈ V and i(t) = [i1(t), . . . , in(t)] ∈ [0, 1]n for
all v ∈ V . Note that fv(i) is continuously differentiable in
[0, 1]n. Lemma 1 below shows that system (1) with α ≥ 0 is
cooperative.
Lemma 1: System (1) with α ≥ 0 is cooperative.
Proof: For u ∈ Nv, we have
∂fv(i)
∂iu
= −(1− α)(−γ)
∏
w∈Nv,w 6=u
(
1− γiw(t)
)(
1− iv(t)
)
≥ 0.
For u /∈ Nv, Eq. (5) implies that ∂fv(i)∂iu = 0. It follows that
∂fv(i)
∂iu
≥ 0 for all u 6= v and u, v ∈ V.
According to Definition 1, system (1) is cooperative.
Lemma 2 below shows that all trajectories of system (1) are
always bounded within [0, 1]n.
Lemma 2: Let i(t) be the trajectory of system (1).
(a) If α > 0, i(t) will eventually enter the domain [ǫ, 1− ǫ]n
for some constant ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ∗1) where 0 < ǫ∗1 ≤
min
{
1
2 ,
β
β+1 ,
α
α+β
}
. In other words, i(t) ∈ [ǫ, 1 − ǫ]n
when t→ +∞.
(b) If α = 0, i(t) will eventually enter the domain [0, 1− ǫ]n
for some constant ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ∗2) where 0 < ǫ∗2 ≤
min
{
1
2 ,
β
β+1
}
. In other words, i(t) ∈ [0, 1 − ǫ]n when
t→ +∞.
Proof: We prove the lemma for the case α > 0, while
noting that the case α = 0 can be proven similarly. When
α > 0, we prove that the region [ǫ, 1−ǫ]n is positively invariant
for some constant ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ∗1). For v ∈ V , we have
div(t)
dt
∣∣∣∣
iv(t)=ǫ
= −βǫ+
[
1− (1− α)
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)]
(1 − ǫ)
≥ −βǫ+ α(1− ǫ)
and
div(t)
dt
∣∣∣∣
iv(t)=1−ǫ
= −β(1 − ǫ) +
[
1− (1− α)
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t))
)]
ǫ
< −β(1 − ǫ) + ǫ.
Then, there exists a constant ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ∗1) with ǫ∗1 ≤
min
{
1
2 ,
β
β+1 ,
α
α+β
}
, such that
div(t)
dt
∣∣∣∣
iv(t)=ǫ
> 0 and div(t)
dt
∣∣∣∣
iv(t)=1−ǫ
< 0.
This implies that if iv(0) ∈ [ǫ, 1 − ǫ], then iv(t) ∈ [ǫ, 1 − ǫ]
for all t ∈ [0,+∞). This means that [ǫ, 1 − ǫ]n is positively
invariant.
Observe that if iv(t) 6 ǫ, then we have
div(t)
dt
= −βiv(t) +
[
1− (1− α)
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)](
1− iv(t)
)
> −βǫ+ α(1 − ǫ) > 0.
If iv(t) > 1− ǫ, then it holds that
div(t)
dt
= −βiv(t) +
[
1− (1− α)
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)](
1− iv(t)
)
6 −β(1 − ǫ) + ǫ < 0.
6Hence, [ǫ, 1−ǫ]n is attracting and the trajectories i(t) of system
(1) will eventually enter domain [ǫ, 1 − ǫ]n regardless of the
initial value.
B. Global Stability and Convergence Speed
1) The Case α > 0: Lemma 2 showed that all trajectories
i(t) of system (1) will eventually enter an open subset of
[0, 1]n. This means that if system (1) has an equilibrium,
the equilibrium does not belong to any boundary of [0, 1]n.
Theorem 7 below shows that there indeed exists a unique
equilibrium in [0, 1]n, and the equilibrium is neither O nor
1.
Theorem 7: Given model parameters G, α, β and γ as
specified above, let f(i) : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n be the continuous
map defined in Eq. (5). If α > 0, there exists a unique
equilibrium i∗ = [i∗1, . . . , i∗n] ∈ [0, 1]n\{O,1} such that every
trajectory of system (1) always converges to i∗, meaning that
the preventive and reactive defense dynamics is globally stable.
Moreover, the convergence is exponential for except for some
zero-measure set of (α, β, γ) ∈ [0, 1]3.
Remark. The convergence speed proven in Theorem 7 holds
except for some zero-measure set of (α, β, γ)’s. The exclusion
of this zero-measure set is necessarily for mathematical rigor,
but has no practical impact because the probability that such
(α, β, γ)’s can be sampled is zero.
2) The Case α = 0: As mentioned above, in the special
case α = 0, condition (4) degenerates to condition (3). Now
we prove that when condition (3) does not hold, the dynamics
is still globally stable.
Theorem 8: Given model parameters G, α = 0, β and γ as
specified above, let f(i) : [0, 1]n → [0, 1]n be the continuous
map as defined in Eq. (5) and α = 0.
1) In the case λA,1 ≤ β/γ, it holds that every trajectory
i(t) of system (1) converges to O. (This supersedes the
result proven in, for example, [4], [34], which applies to
λA,1 < β/γ only.) When λA,1 < β/γ, the convergence
speed has been proven to be exponential [4], [34]; when
λ1 = β/γ, we prove here that the convergence speed is
polynomial.
2) In the case λA,1 > β/γ, then there exists a unique equi-
librium i∗ ∈ [0, 1]n\{O,1} such that every trajectory
i(t) of system (1) converges to some i∗. Moreover, the
convergence is exponential except for a zero-measure set
of (β, γ) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Remark. Similar to the case of Theorem 7, the exclusion of
some set of zero measures is for mathematical rigor and has
no practical side-effect. On the other hand, Theorem 8 also
has a nice side-product. In [4], it was claimed that condition
(3), namely λA,1 < β/γ, is necessary and sufficient for the
dynamics with α = 0 to converge to equilibrium O. In [34], it
was shown that condition (3) is sufficient, but not necessary.
The evidence given in [34] is a counter-example, but no
explanation why condition (3) is not necessary. Theorem 8
fills the void by showing that condition (3) or λA,1 < β/γ is
not necessary for the dynamics to converge to equilibrium O,
because the dynamics also converges to equilibrium O when
λA,1 = β/γ.
3) Extension to the Case of Node Heterogeneity: The
global stability result established by Theorems 7-8 assume
node-independent parameters, namely that α, β and γ are
independent of v ∈ V . While node-independent parameters
may be true for uniformly defended enterprise networks, one
would wonder whether or not the global stability result is
still valid when the model parameters are node-dependent.
This is a legitimate question because in practice, different
computers may employ different sets of preventive and reactive
defense mechanisms, which may have different capabilities
in defending against attacks. This suggests us to consider
node-dependent parameters αv , βv and γuv, which lead to the
following system (6).
div(t)
dt
(6)
= −βviv(t) +
[
1− (1− αv)
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γuviu(t)
)](
1− iv(t)
)
.
Theorem 9 below shows that system (6) is still globally stable.
The proof of Theorem 9 is omitted because it is similar to the
proof of Theorem 7.
Theorem 9: System (6) is globally stable, meaning that
there exists a unique equilibrium i∗ ∈ [0, 1]n such that every
trajectory of system (6) converges to i∗.
C. Bounding the Unique Equilibrium
Having proved the global stability of the dynamics in the
entire parameter universe, namely the existence and unique-
ness of equilibrium i∗ = [i∗1, · · · , i∗n], it would be ideal if we
can get an analytic expression of i∗ from
i∗v =
1− (1− α)
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γi∗u
)
β + 1− (1 − α)
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γi∗u
)
for all u, v ∈ V . This turns out to be a difficult problem,
except for some special cases. For example, in the special
case α = 1, β = 1, γ = 1, the system (1) can be simplified as
div(t)
dt
= −2iv(t) + 1, v ∈ V.
The solution to this system of differential equations is:
iv(t) = −
1
2
e−2t +
1
2
.
The unique equilibrium is i∗ = [ 12 , · · · ,
1
2 ]n.
As an alternative, we now aim to bound the equilibrium
because the bounds can be useful (e.g., the upper bound can
be used in cyber defense decision-making for accommodating
the worst-case scenario). To simplify the presentation, let
imin = min
v∈V
inf
t∈[0,+∞)
{iv(t)} (7)
and
imax = max
v∈V
sup
t∈[0,+∞)
{iv(t)} (8)
Now, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 10: Let i(t) = [i1(t), . . . , in(t)] be the solution to
system (1), i(t) = [i1(t), · · · , in(t)] denote the lower bound
7of i(t) and i(t) = [i1(t), · · · , in(t)] denote the upper bound
of i(t). Then we have
iv(t) ≤ iv(t) ≤ iv(t)
with
iv(t) =
[
iv(0)−
Qv
β + Pv
]
e−(β+Pv)t +
Qv
β + Pv
(9)
and
iv(t) =
[
iv(0)−
Pv
β +Qv
]
e−(β+Qv)t +
Pv
β +Qv
(10)
where
Pv =


0,
if α = 0 and λA,1 ≤ βγ
1− (1− α)(1 − γimax)
dv ,
if (α = 0 and λA,1 > βγ ) or (α > 0)
and
Qv =


0,
if α = 0 and λA,1 ≤ βγ
1− (1− α)
(
1
dv
) 1
dv
(1 − γimin)
dv ,
if (α = 0 and λA,1 > βγ ) or (α > 0)
for v ∈ V and t ∈ [0,+∞).
The numerical simulation reported in Section V shows that
these bounds are tighter than the bounds presented in [34]. The
tightness comes from (i) knowing the global stability of the
dynamics allows us to identify imin and imax, which had to
be respectively set to 0 and 1 in [34] because of the lack
of information on the global stability, and (ii) we use the
geometric average to make the bounds accommodate nodes’
(in-)degree deg(v).
V. SIMULATION-BASED VALIDATION
It would be ideal if we can use real data to validate the
theoretical results. Unfortunately, we do not have access to
such data, which is hard to obtain because of legal and privacy
concerns. Instead, we use simulation to validate the results,
namely the global stability of the dynamics, the relative tight-
ness of the new upper and lower bounds of the equilibrium,
and the convergence speed.
Methodology. In our simulation, we track the state of a node
as
χv(t) =
{
0 v is secure at time t
1 v is compromised at time t.
The rate at which v’s state changes from secure to compro-
mised at time t is denoted by θ˜v,0→1(t), which is a random
variable dependent upon the success of pull-based and push-
based attacks (because the number of compromised neighbors
is a random variable). The rate at which v’s state changes
from compromised to secure at time t is denoted by θ˜v,1→0(t),
which is dependent upon the reactive defense power. The
state transition of v is a Markov process with the following
transition probabilities:
P(χv(t+∆t) = 0
∣∣χv(t))
=
{
1−∆t · θ˜v,0→1(t) + o(∆t), χv(t) = 0
∆t · θ˜v,1→0(t) + o(∆t), χv(t) = 1
(11)
and
P(χv(t+∆t) = 1
∣∣χv(t))
=
{
∆t · θ˜v,0→1(t) + o(∆t), χv(t) = 0
1−∆t · θ˜v,1→0(t) + o(∆t), χv(t) = 1
(12)
as ∆t → 0. It is worthy mentioning that, to the best of our
knowledge, this Markov process is not tractable because of the
exponential state space and the random (rather than fixed) state
transition rate θ˜v,0→1(t). We describe the simulation result
succinctly by plotting the average of
∑
v∈V χv(t)/n over 50
simulation runs, each of which corresponds to a random initial
value [χ1(0), . . . , χn(0)] ∈ {0, 1}n. The global stability result
says that all 50 runs converge to 〈iv(t)〉v∈V =
∑
v∈V iv(t)/n,
which can be numerically computed from Eq. (1).
Simulation parameters. The simulation focuses on our new
results, namely the parameter regimes other than those that
have been well understood according to [4], [34]. Specifically,
in the case α = 0, we focus on the parameter regimes with
λA,1 ≥ β/γ, which violate the previously-known convergence
condition (3) as discussed above; in the case α > 0, we
focus on the parameter regimes with λ(H+γ(1−α)A),1 ≥ 1,
which violate the previously-known convergence condition (3)
as discussed above. In the simulation, we set ∆t = 0.05,
θ˜v,1→0(t) = β, and
θ˜v,0→1(t) = 1− (1− α)
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γχu(t)
)
.
In each of the 50 simulation runs, we set iv(0) for v ∈ V
to be a number independently and randomly chosen from an
arbitrarily chosen interval [0.2, 0.9], and then determine the
state χv(0) according to iv(0). For G, we use the following
network structures that are available from http://snap.stanford.
edu/data/. These two networks can be used as examples of
cyber attack structure G because attacks can indeed follow
these topologies.
• The Gnutella peer-to-peer network: a directed graph with
n = 8, 114 nodes, |E| = 26, 013 links, maximal node
in-degree 61 and λA,1 = 4.5361. For this network, we
consider the following parameter combinations:
(a) α = 0, β = 0.6805 and γ = 0.15, namely, λA,1 =
β/γ, meaning that 〈iv(t)〉v∈V should converge to
zero.
(b) α = 0, β = 0.8387 and γ = 0.3568, namely, λA,1 >
β/γ, meaning that 〈iv(t)〉v∈V should converge to a
non-zero equilibrium.
(c) α = 0.2456, β = 0.8159 and γ = 0.3102, namely,
λ(H+γ(1−α)A),1 = 1, meaning that 〈iv(t)〉v∈V
should converge to a non-zero equilibrium.
8(d) α = 0.4061, β = 0.7395, γ = 0.2012, namely,
λ(H+γ(1−α)A),1 > 1, meaning that 〈iv(t)〉v∈V
should converge to a non-zero equilibrium.
• The Facebook social network: an undirected graph with
n = 4, 039 nodes, |E| = 88, 234 links, maximal node
degree 1, 044 and λA,1 = 162.3739. For this network,
we use the following parameter combinations:
(a) α = 0, β = 0.4971 and γ = 0.0030, namely,
λA,1 = β/γ, meaning that 〈iv(t)〉v∈V should con-
verge to zero.
(b) α = 0, β = 0.8387 and γ = 0.0579, namely, λA,1 >
β/γ, meaning that 〈iv(t)〉v∈V should converge to a
non-zero equilibrium.
(c) α = 0.6535, β = 0.8656 and γ = 0.0270, namely,
λ(H+γ(1−α)A),1 = 1, meaning that 〈iv(t)〉v∈V
should converge to a non-zero equilibrium.
(d) α = 0.4361, β = 0.7395 and γ = 0.0202, namely,
λ(H+γ(1−α)A),1 > 1, meaning that 〈iv(t)〉v∈V
should converge to a non-zero equilibrium.
Confirmation of global stability and relative tightness
of the bounds. For the Gnutella network structure, Figure
5 plots the simulation result, the numerical model predic-
tion according to system (1), the new upper bound i(t) =∑
v∈V iv(t)/n according to Eq. (10), the new lower bound
i(t) =
∑
v∈V iv(t)/n according to Eq. (9), and the upper
bound η as well as lower bound ζ given in [34]. We observe
that the model prediction matches the simulation result well,
while noting that the simulation result oscillates slightly. In
order to see that the dynamics in each of the 50 simulation
runs converge to the same equilibrium, we calculate, for each
t ∈ [50, 500], the difference
∑
v∈V |χv(t) − iv(t)|/n, where
χv(t) is obtained from the simulation and iv(t) is numerically
obtained from system (1). In principle, the difference should
be close to zero in each of the simulation runs and for any
t ∈ [50, 500]. In order to succinctly represent and confirm
this, we first calculate for each t ∈ [50, 5000] the standard
deviations of the 50 differences
∑
v∈V |χv(t)/n − iv(t)|/n
corresponding to the 50 simulation runs, and then calculate
the mean (denoted by m) and standard deviation (denoted by
sd) of these standard deviations corresponding to time interval
t ∈ [50, 500]. In principle, it should hold that m ≈ 0 and
sd ≈ 0. For the parameter combinations (a)-(d) mentioned
above, we respectively have m = 0.0009, 0.0139, 0.0573,
0.0319 and sd = 0.0003, 0.0027, 0.0034, 0.0021. This
confirms the global stability of the dynamics. On the other
hand, the new bounds are at least as tight as the previous
bounds given in [34], and the new bounds are substantially
tighter in most cases except for the upper bound for parameter
combination (b).
For the Facebook network structure, Figure 4 plots the
simulation result, the numerical model prediction according
to system (1), the new upper bound i(t), the new lower bound
i(t), and the upper bound η and lower bound ζ given in [34].
We observe that the model prediction matches the simulation
result well. For the parameter combinations (a)-(d) mentioned
above, we report that m = 0.0011, 0.0281, 0.0424, 0.0286,
and that sd = 0.0005, 0.0017, 0.0029, 0.0032, respectively.
This confirms that all of the 50 simulated dynamics converge
to the same equilibrium. We also observe that the new bounds
are at least at tight as the previous ones, and are substantially
tighter than the previous bounds in most cases except for the
upper bound in the case of parameter combination (b).
By comparing Figure 5 and Figure 4, we observe that even
the new bounds for α = 0 with λA,1 > β/γ can be very loose.
This offers a great opportunity for future research: How can
we characterize the circumstances under which the bounds are
tight enough?
Confirmation of convergence speed. Theorems 7 and 8
showed that the convergence is polynomial in the case α = 0
with λA,1 = β/γ, and is exponential in all other cases. In order
to confirm these results, we define the following indicator of
convergence speed:
S(t) =
1
t
log
∥∥∥∥ i(t+∆t)− i(t)∆t
∥∥∥∥ (13)
=
1
t
log
(∑
v∈V
∣∣∣∣ iv(t+∆t)− iv(t)∆t
∣∣∣∣
)
.
We choose this definition because limt→+∞ S(t) = 0 means
the convergence is polynomial and limt→+∞ S(t) = s for
some negative constant s means the convergence is exponen-
tial.
For the Gnutella network structure, Figure 6(a) plots the
convergence speed given by Eq. (13) in the parameter com-
binations mentioned above. We observe that the convergence
in case α = 0 with λA,1 = β/γ steadily goes to 0, which
confirms the polynomial convergence. For the other cases, the
simulation result confirms that the convergence is exponential
because Eq. (13) goes to a negative constant in these cases.
Figure 6(b) plots the convergence with respect to the Facebook
network structure, which exhibits similar phenomena.
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Fig. 4. The case G is the Facebook network: comparison between the simulation result, model prediction, new upper bound i¯(t), new lower bound i(t),
and previous upper bound η as well as lower bound ζ .
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Fig. 5. The case G is the Gnutella network: comparison between the simulation result, model prediction, new upper bound i¯(t), new lower bound i(t), and
previous upper bound η as well as lower bound ζ .
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VI. RELATED WORK
The most closely related prior work is [34], which gave the
first theoretical characterization of preventive and reactive cy-
ber defenses against push-based and pull-based cyber attacks.
The model of preventive and reactive defense dynamics was
introduced in [16], which however did not give a satisfac-
tory analytic treatment of the dynamics. The characterization
presented in [34] supersedes the model of preventive and
reactive cyber defenses against push-based cyber attacks (i.e.,
pull-based attacks were not accommodated), which has been
investigated in many prior studies (e.g., [27], [7], [4]). In
particular, [27] is the first paper that established the connection
between the fate of the dynamics in arbitrary cyber attack
structures and their algebraic properties. Our results supersede
the ones presented in [34], and therefore the results presented
in [27], [7], [4]. In particular, we show that the dynamics
of preventive and reactive defenses against push- and pull-
based attacks is globally stable in the entire parameter universe
that has been investigated in the literature, which gives a full
characterization of the dynamics.
In a broader context, preventive and reactive defense dy-
namics is a specific kind of cybersecurity dynamics [30],
[31]. In parallel to preventive and reactive defense dynamics,
the following kinds of dynamics have been studied recently:
adaptive defense dynamics [35], active defense dynamics
[39], [33], [18], and proactive defense dynamics [8]; Deeply
understanding these kinds of dynamics will pave the way for
establishing a unified framework that accommodates all kinds
of attacks and all kinds of defenses [30].
VII. CONCLUSION
We have shown that preventive and reactive defense dy-
namics is globally stable in the entire parameter universe, and
discussed its cybersecurity meanings. Our characterization of
the convergence speed has led to a complete understanding on
this matter in the entire parameter universe. We have presented
new bounds of the equilibrium, and showed that these bounds
are tighter than the ones given in the literature.
We have discussed several exciting directions for future
research in Section II. In addition, we anticipate that the
dynamics is also globally stable in the discrete-time model
[34]. Due to space limitation, we will give a detailed analysis
elsewhere.
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APPENDIX
Proof: (proof of Theorem 7) Consider the continuous map
g(i) : [0, 1]n → [1, 1 + ρ]n with g(i) = 1 + ρf(i) and ρ > 0
being a constant. For any δ ∈ (0, 1), i ∈ [0, 1]n\{O} and
α > 0, we have
gv(δi)− δgv(i) = (1 − δ) + ρf(δi)− δρf(i)
= (1− δ) + ρ
{
− βδiv(t) +[
1− (1 − α)
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γδiu(t)
)](
1− δiv(t)
)
+ βδiv(t)
−δ
[
1− (1− α)
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)](
1− iv(t)
)}
> (1− δ) + ρ
(
1− iv(t)
){[
1− (1− α)
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γδiu(t)
)]
−δ
[
1− (1− α)
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)]}
= (1− δ) + ρ
(
1− iv(t)
){
(1− δ)− (1− α)×
[ ∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γδiu(t)
)
− δ
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)]}
> 0 /* by using δ ∈ (0, 1) and inequality (14) below */
for all v ∈ V . This means g(δi) > δg(i) for any δ ∈ (0, 1).
According to Definition 2, g(i) is strongly subhomogeneous
on [0, 1]n. This means condition (b) required by Theorem 2
is satisfied. Since system (1) is cooperative, Theorem 1 says
f(i) is monotone on [0, 1]n, which means g(i) is monotone
on [0, 1]n. This means condition (a) required by Theorem
2 is satisfied. Lemma 2 says the domain [ǫ, 1 − ǫ]n is a
nonempty compact invariant subset of [0, 1]n, and Theorem
2 says that [ǫ, 1 − ǫ]n contains a single equilibrium. Because
g(i) = 1+ρf(i) and f(i) is a continuously monotone function
on [ǫ, 1 − ǫ]n, f(i) admits only one equilibrium i∗ ≫ O in
[ǫ, 1−ǫ]n. Theorem 3 says that every trajectory attracted to the
closed domain [ǫ, 1 − ǫ]n that contains only one equilibrium
i∗ converges to i∗. Lemma 2 says i(t) will eventually enter
the domain [ǫ, 1 − ǫ]n. Hence, we conclude that there exists
a unique equilibrium i∗ ∈ [0, 1]n\{O,1} such that every
trajectory of system (1) always converges to i∗.
The remaining task is to prove the following inequality (14):
(1− δ)− (1− α)×[ ∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γδiu(t)
)
− δ
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)]
> 0. (14)
In what follows we prove inequality (14) for any node v, by
induction on deg(v).
When deg(v) = 1, we have
(1− δ)− (1 − α)
[(
1− γδiu(t)
)
− δ
(
1− γiu(t)
)]
=
(
1− iv(t)
)
(1− δ)α > 0.
Suppose inequality (14) holds when deg(v) = dv with 1 ≤
dv < n, namely,
(1− δ)−
(1− α)
[ ∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γδiu(t)
)
− δ
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)]
> 0.
When deg(v) = dv + 1, we have
(1 − δ)− (1 − α)×[ ∏
u∈Nv∪{w}
(
1− γδiu(t)
)
− δ
∏
u∈Nv∪{w}
(
1− γiu(t)
)]
= (1 − δ)− (1 − α)×[ ∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γδiu(t)
)
− δ
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)]
+ (1− α)×
[ ∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γδiu(t)
)
γδiw(t)− δ
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)
γiw(t)
]
> (1 − α)
[ ∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γδiu(t)
)
−
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)]
γδiw(t)
> 0
where w 6= u and u,w ∈ Nv . This means inequality (14)
holds when deg(v) = dv + 1. In other words, inequality (14)
holds for every deg(v).
Now we prove that the convergence is exponential. We
observe that the largest real part of all eigenvalues of the
Jacobin matrix [∂fv
∂iu
]nv,u=1 at equilibrium i = i∗ should be
non-positive (otherwise, i∗ is unstable). Let
G(α) = max
{
Re(λ) : λ ∈ σ
([
∂fv
∂iu
]n
v,u=1
)}
,
where σ(·) stands for the set of eigenvalues of the Jacobin
matrix and Re(·) stands for the real parts of the eigenvalues.
Lemma 1 showed that system (1) is cooperative, meaning that
all off-diagonal elements of the Jacobin matrix are nonnegative
and G(α) is one of the eigenvalues. Since G(α) is an analytic
function with respect to α, the solutions of G(α) = 0 is
finite in (0, 1]. This means that the set Wα of solutions of
G(α) = 0 has a zero measure. If α /∈ Wα, then G(α) < 0,
meaning that the convergence towards i∗ is exponential. The
same reasoning applies to β and Wβ as well as γ and
Wγ . Putting these together, we conclude that the dynamics
converges to i∗ exponentially except for a zero-measure set
of (α, β, γ) ∈ Wα ×Wβ ×Wγ ⊂ [0, 1]3. This completes the
proof.
Proof: (proof of Theorem 8) When α = 0, it is clear that
i∗ = O is an equilibrium of system (1).
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If λA,1 ≤ β/γ, Lemma 1 says that system (1) with α = 0 is
cooperative. Lemma 2 tells that every trajectory i(t) of system
(1) with α = 0 will eventually enter the bounded domain
[0, 1 − ǫ]n for some constant ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ∗2) where 0 < ǫ∗2 ≤ 12 .
The first result in Theorem 4 as well as its proof confirms that
every trajectory i(t) of system (1) will converge to equilibrium
O.
Now we prove the convergence is polynomial when λA,1 =
β/γ. We observe that all off-diagonal elements of the Jacobin
matrix at equilibrium i = i∗ are nonnegative. Without loss
of generality, we suppose that the geometrical dimension of
eigenvalue λA,1 is 1, because it is straightforward to deal with
the case that the geometrical dimension is greater than 1.
This means that the right eigenvector associated with λA,1
has all components nonnegative, which can be denoted by
ξ = [ξ1, · · · , ξn]
⊤ with
∑n
v=1 ξv = 1. Let j(t) = i(t) − i
∗
be the variation at i∗, which exponentially converges to zero
in the direction of ξ. Consider j(t) = η(t)ξ for some scalar
function η(t). From the Taylor’s expansion of system (1) at
equilibrium i = i∗ up to the second order, we have, for v ∈ V ,
dη(t)
dt
ξv =
n∑
u=1
∂fv
∂iu
(i∗)ξuη(t)− c
∗
vη
2(t) +O
(
η3(t)
)
= −c∗vη
2(t) +O
(
η3(t)
) (15)
with
c∗v = −2(1− α)γ
∑
w∈Nv
∏
u′ 6=w
u′∈Nv
(1− γi∗u′)ξwξv
−(1− i∗v)(1 − α)γ
2
∑
u,w 6=v
u,w∈Nv
∏
u′ /∈{u,w}
u′∈Nv
(1 − γi∗u′)ξuξw.
Summing equations (15) over v, we have
dη(t)
dt
= −c∗η2(t) +O
(
η3(t)
)
with c∗ =
∑n
v=1 c
∗
v is a positive constant. This means that
the convergence of η(t) towards zero is polynomial near
equilibrium i∗. This completes the proof of the first statement
in Theorem 8.
If λA,1 > β/γ, we first consider the case that G is strongly
connected and then extend the analysis to the case that G has
an arbitrary topology.
In the case G is strongly connected, we observe that
condition (a) of Theorem 4 is satisfied. Similar to the algebra
used in the proof in Theorem 7, we can use induction to prove
fv(δi)− δfv(i)
= −βδiv + (1−
∏
u∈Nv
(1− δγiu))(1 − δiv)
−δ
[
− βiv + (1−
∏
u∈Nv
(1 − γiu))(1 − iv)
]
(16)
>
(
1− iv(t)
){
(1− δ)−
[ ∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γδiu(t)
)
−δ
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)]}
> 0
when there exists v ∈ V such that deg(v) ≥ 2. When
deg(v) ≤ 1 for all v ∈ V , it can be verified directly
from Eq. (16) that fv(δi) > δfv(i) still holds. Note that
[∂fv(i)/∂iu]u,v∈Vp−1 is irreducible andfv(i) is strictly sub-
homogeneous for v ∈ Vp−1 and i ≫ O. By Theorem 4, we
have limt→∞ i(t) = i∗ for all initial values in (0, 1]n, where
i∗ ≫ O.
In the case G is not strongly connected, G can be partitioned
into some strongly connected components according to the
Frobenius form (2). This means that there are two cases: p = 2
and p > 2.
When p = 2, A has the following form:
A =
[
A11 A12
0 A22
]
where A12 is not a zero matrix. For an arbitrary strongly
connected component V2 without in-edges, if V2 is singlet,
then it is trivial to prove that iV2 converges to some positive
value for all v ∈ Vj ; otherwise, following the same algebras
above, under the conditions that deg(v) ≥ 2 for some v ∈ V2,
one can prove that iv(t) converges to some positive value,
i∗v > 0, for all v ∈ V2. Then, we can rewrite Eq. (1) restricted
on V1 as follows
div(t)
dt
= −βiv(t) +
[
1−
∏
u∈Nv
⋂
V1
(
1− γiu(t)
)
·
∏
u∈Nv
⋂
V2
(
1− γiu(t)
)](
1− iv(t)
) (17)
for v ∈ V1. By assigning iv(t) as i∗v for each v ∈ V2, Eq. (17)
asymptotically becomes
div(t)
dt
= −βiv(t) +
[
1− c∗
∏
u∈Nv
⋂
V1
(
1− γiu(t)
)](
1− iv(t)
)
(18)
for v ∈ V1 with c∗ =
∏
u∈Nv
⋂
V2
(1 − γi∗u) being a positive
constant less than 1. If λA11,1 ≤ β/γ, we already proved
in the first case of the present theorem that subsystem (18)
converges. If λA11,1 > β/γ, since A11 is a strongly connected
component, we can also obtain that subsystem (18) converges
by using the same method as for proving that iv(t) converges
to i∗v for all v ∈ V2.
When p > 2, we can use induction on p to prove that iv(t)
converges to i∗v for all v ∈ V .
The exponential convergence of the dynamics under the
condition λA,1 > β/γ can be proven similarly to the proof of
the convergence speed in Theorem 7. In other words, except
some zero-measure set of (β, γ) ∈ [0, 1]2, the convergence for
system (1) with λA,1 > β/γ is exponential. This completes
the proof of the second statement in Theorem 8.
Proof: (proof of Theorem 10) For each node v ∈ V ,
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consider the following derivatives:
div(t)
dt
= −βiv(t) +
[
1− (1 − α)
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)](
1− iv(t)
)
≥ −βiv(t) +{
1− (1− α)
[
1
dv
∑
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)]dv}(
1− iv(t)
)
≥ −βiv(t)−
[
1− (1 − α)(1 − γimax)
dv
]
iv(t) +[
1− (1− α)
(
1
dv
)dv ∑
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)dv]
≥ −
[
β + 1− (1− α)(1 − γimax)
dv
]
iv(t) +[
1− (1− α)
(
1
dv
)dv−1
(1− γimin)
dv
]
≥ −
[
β + 1− (1− α)(1 − γimax)
dv
]
iv(t) +[
1− (1− α)
(
1
dv
) 1
dv
(1− γimin)
dv
]
,
and
div(t)
dt
= −βiv(t) +
[
1− (1 − α)
∏
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)](
1− iv(t)
)
≤ −βiv(t)−
{
1− (1 − α)
[
1
dv
∑
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)]dv}
iv(t)
+
[
1− (1− α)(1 − γimax)
dv
]
≤ −βiv(t)−
[
1− (1 − α)
(
1
dv
)dv ∑
u∈Nv
(
1− γiu(t)
)dv]
iv(t)
+
[
1− (1− α)(1 − γimax)
dv
]
≤ −
[
β + 1− (1− α)
(
1
dv
)dv−1
(1− γimin)
dv
]
iv(t)
+
[
1− (1− α)(1 − γimax)
dv
]
≤ −
[
β + 1− (1− α)
(
1
dv
) 1
dv
(1− γimin)
dv
]
iv(t)
+
[
1− (1− α)(1 − γimax)
dv
]
.
For any v ∈ V , we observe the following:

div(t)
dt
≥ −(β − Pv)iv(t) +Qv
div(t)
dt
≤ −(β −Qv)iv(t) + Pv
where
Pv =


0,
if α = 0 and λA,1 ≤ βγ
1− (1− α)(1 − γimax)
dv ,
if (α = 0 and λA,1 > βγ ) or (α > 0)
,
Qv =


0,
if α = 0 and λA,1 ≤ βγ
1− (1− α)
(
1
dv
) 1
dv
(1− γimin)
dv ,
if (α = 0 and λA,1 > βγ ) or (α > 0)
.
with imin and imax defined in (7) and (8).
According to the Gronwall inequality [25], we obtain
iv(t) ≤ iv(t) ≤ iv(t) where
iv(t) =
[
iv(0)−
Qv
β + Pv
]
e−(β+Pv)t +
Qv
β + Pv
and
iv(t) =
[
iv(0)−
Pv
β +Qv
]
e−(β+Qv)t +
Pv
β +Qv
for any v ∈ V and all t ∈ [0,+∞). This completes the proof.
